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MODERN DAY BUCKET SHOPS?
FANTASY SPORTS AND ILLEGAL
EXCHANGES
by: John T. Holden* & Ryan M. Rodenberg**
ABSTRACT
The rapid emergence of online daily fantasy sports has raised questions as
to why the contests are allowed, while other forms of gambling are restricted.
Historically, “bucket shops” were banned enterprises where businesses would
effectively accept wagers on whether companies’ stock prices would go up or
down. There was never an underlying investment in companies themselves,
only a deposit into a “bucket.” While bucket shops have largely faded, we
examine whether they have disappeared in name only. Our analysis opens up
another avenue for regulators beyond the antiquated skill-versus-chance eval-
uation typically applied to gambling activities and suggests that certain fantasy
contests may run counter to Commodity Futures Trading Commission regula-
tions. Applying this existing regulatory framework would likely enhance con-
sumer protection and market integrity.
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“We make our money as any other marketplace business does. We
match effectively buyers and sellers together.”1
– Matt King, FanDuel executive
“[I]t’s a lot harder to beat a business than it is to beat one person.”2
– Peter Jennings, fantasy and sports betting expert
I. INTRODUCTION
Regulating new financial products poses a challenge for the federal
government, particularly when the product does not neatly fit within
the classification of any existing concept or term. The Daily Fantasy
Sports (“DFS”) industry appears closely tied to sports gambling when
looked at from a casual observer’s perspective; however, many types
of commonly used investment products may also appear to have ele-
ments of gambling.3 The federal government often treats sports gam-
bling and derivative products differently than traditional stock market
investments, even though the government cannot sufficiently differen-
tiate between these activities—at least in determining whether the ac-
tivity is skill- or luck-based.4 Those who suggest that sports gambling
offers a meaningful opportunity for investors to hedge against risk and
maintain a diversified investment portfolio may facilitate a transition
from the treatment of sports gambling as a societal plague to an activ-
ity that allows investors a lucrative opportunity to balance other finan-
cial commitments.5 Presently, the DFS industry remains devoid of
1. Jason M. Breslow, Matt King: Daily Fantasy Sports Are “Entertainment,” Not
Gambling, PBS FRONTLINE (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/
matt-king-daily-fantasy-sports-are-entertainment-not-gambling [https://perma.cc/
E5WP-4GF2].
2. Dan Barbarisi, DraftKings and FanDuel Bet They’re Ready for a Second Act;
Can They Take Over Sports Gambling?, ATHLETIC (June 4, 2018), http://
www.theathletic.com/377565/2018/06/04/draftkings-and-fanduel-bet-theyll-have-a-
second-act-can-they-take-over-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/A2CE-L88Y].
3. Gambling is generally considered to have three elements: prize, chance, and
consideration. See Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, Fantasy Sports: One Form of
Mainstream Wagering in the United States, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1195, 1203 (2007).
4. See Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets: Online Se-
curities Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV.
371, 387–88 (2006).
5. See Michael C. Macchiarola, Rethinking Sports Wagering, 85 IND. L.J. SUPP. 1,
6, 8 (2010) (addressing the roadblocks created by the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act, or “PASPA,” which was recently held to be unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court in Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461,
1484–85 (2018), and arguing for the regulation of sports wagering under the federal
securities laws). See also Michael C. Macchiarola, Securities Linked to the Perform-
ance of Tiger Woods? Not Such A Long Shot, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29 (2008) (dis-
cussing the divergence between gambling and typical investment vehicles and the
disparate treatment of sports wagering under federal regulations); Jeffrey Standen,
The Beauty of Bets: Wagers as Compensation for Professional Athletes, 42 WILLAM-
ETTE L. REV. 639 (2006) (providing an insightful discussion of sports betting and in
the world of fantasy leagues and suggesting that sports leagues’ rationales for banning
gambling do not justify certain prohibitions); Christopher T. Pickens, Of Bookies and
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regulation at the federal level.6 But while no federal agency has as-
serted regulatory jurisdiction over the DFS industry, there neverthe-
less exists the possibility that certain DFS contests violate laws and
regulations within the regulatory purview of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”).
DFS contests have been around in some form for close to a decade,
but only in the last four years did the games rise to prominence.7 Un-
like traditional fantasy sports, which Americans have played in vari-
ous forms for several decades and take place over the length of an
entire sports season, DFS contests take place over a period of time as
short as an afternoon.8 There are a variety of different DFS contests
that companies offer, though customers play three types most fre-
quently: (1) guaranteed prize pools (“GPPs”); (2) 50/50s; and (3)
head-to-head games.9 GPPs are large-scale tournaments where
thousands of competitors can compete for prizes by selecting fantasy
lineups and competing against others in the pool.10 The payout for the
winner of a GPP can be upwards of seven figures, but prizes are typi-
cally reserved for only the contest’s top competitors [or finishers].11
The 50/50s, also referred to as double-ups, are pool games where the
top half of competitors in a contest double their money, whereas those
in the bottom half of the pool walk away with nothing.12 Head-to-
head contests are one-on-one, peer-to-peer contests with users com-
peting directly against one another and the winner receiving a pre-set
amount of money that is less than the combined entry fees.13 The pri-
Brokers: Are Sports Futures Gambling or Investing, and Does It Even Matter?, 14
GEO. MASON L. REV. 227, 247–56 (2006) (arguing against the “gambling-investing
dichotomy”).
6. This Article is focused on regulation of the DFS industry at the federal level,
but there are also great disparities in the treatment of DFS among the states, ranging
from complete legality to complete illegality. See Dustin Gouker, Legislative Tracker:
Daily Fantasy Sports, LEGAL SPORTS REP., http://www.legalsportsreport.com/dfs-bill-
tracker (last visited Feb. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/C9L4-RCQJ] (providing details
on state-by-state regulation of daily fantasy sports).
7. John T. Holden & Simon A. Brandon-Lai, Advertised Incentives for Participa-
tion in Daily Fantasy Sports Contests in 2015 and 2016: Legal Classifications and Con-
sumer Implications, 15 ENT. & SPORTS L.J., Oct. 4, 2017, at 1–3.
8. Marc Edelman, Navigating the Legal Risks of Daily Fantasy Sports: A Detailed
Primer in Federal and State Gambling Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 127–29 (2016)
(describing the categories of DFS contests).
9. Nathaniel J. Ehrman, Out of Bounds?: A Legal Analysis of Pay-to-Play Daily
Fantasy Sports, 22 SPORTS L.J. 79, 86 (2015).
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. Id. The amount won is typically reduced by a commission or “rake” held by
the DFS company. See Dustin Gouker, Rake Goes up at DraftKings, FanDuel for
NFL Week 4, and Users Aren’t Happy, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Sept. 26, 2017, 8:12 PM),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/15721/draftkings-fanduel-rake-increases [https://
perma.cc/2TFA-JUPM].
13. See Ehrman, supra note 9. The head-to-head games have been criticized for R
several reasons including their potential to be used for money laundering and the
practice of “bumhunting” whereby experienced users would target newer, less-exper-
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mary focus of this Article is head-to-head games—a close cousin to
the format of stock markets and betting exchanges—but this Article
does tangentially address other DFS contests.
This Article is organized into three sections followed by a conclu-
sion. In Section II, we explore the historical treatment of financial
products and their relationship to gambling. In Section III, we discuss
the scope of the CFTC’s jurisdiction and provide an overview of how
DFS games are structured. In Section IV, we analyze whether certain
DFS contests are within the CFTC’s jurisdiction by virtue of their
structure. We conclude with policy suggestions, including suggestions
for potential regulations associated with the use and misuse of inside
information, which could protect contest integrity and boost consumer
confidence in the industry.
II. MARKET REGULATION
In the United States prior to 1950, both the federal and state gov-
ernments widely prohibited most gambling.14 The preexisting federal
gambling prohibitions eventually gave way to limited forms of legal-
ized gambling at the federal level, provided that gambling operators
complied with an excise tax.15 While the federal government imple-
mented the excise tax to generate revenue, the Supreme Court held
the accompanying disclosure requirements to be unconstitutional
under the Fifth Amendment.16 The modern trend has been to leave
regulation of gambling to the states. While a model anti-gambling
code was proposed in 1952 by a committee of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, many states chose to define gambling individually, leading to
various states criminalizing different activities.17
The internet has complicated regulation at both the intrastate and
interstate levels, as well as internationally where “borderless indus-
tries” like online gambling are the beneficiaries of the global intercon-
nection enabled by the internet.18 While such industries benefit from
the technological revolution, nation-states do not.19 In 2011, the
United States and United Kingdom accounted for 50% of the global
gambling revenues despite broad prohibitions on internet gambling in
ienced players. See John T. Holden et al., Daily Fantasy, Tipping, and Wire Fraud, 21
GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 8, 9–10 (2017).
14. G. Robert Blakey, Legal Regulation of Gambling Since 1950, 474 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. SCI. & SOC. SCI. 12, 13 (1984).
15. Id. at 16.
16. See id. (first citing Marchetti v. United States, 359 U.S. 39 (1968); and then
citing Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968)).
17. Id. at 19–21. See also Ryan Rodenberg, Why Do States Define Gambling Dif-
ferently?, ESPN (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/14799507/daily-
fantasy-why-do-states-define-gambling-differently [https://perma.cc/FE2R-8K85].
18. Betsi Beem & John Mikler, National Regulations for a Borderless Industry: US
Versus UK Approaches to Online Gambling, 30 POL’Y & SOC’Y 161, 161–63 (2011).
19. Id. at 161.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-3\TWL302.txt unknown Seq: 5  6-MAY-19 13:13
2019] FANTASY SPORTS AND ILLEGAL EXCHANGES 623
the United States.20 While the United States and the United Kingdom
represent a majority of the gambling market, the two nations have
different means of regulation; some are a result of American constitu-
tionalism (e.g., federalism and state regulation), and others are mat-
ters of federal prerogatives.21 In addition to various approaches to
regulating gambling, a historical connection exists between gambling
transactions and certain financial products.
Some have observed a trend in the media’s discussion of legalized
sports betting during the emergence of DFS and its growth as an in-
dustry, with advocates for legalization often arguing that the practice
is no different than an investor trading stocks through an online bro-
kerage account.22 However, this likening is far from a perfect fit, and
the distinction between gambling in DFS contests and financial invest-
ing is complicated.23 The difference, as described by Washington Post
columnist Norman Chad, is that while sports gambling, DFS, and in-
vesting in stocks are all forms of gambling, DFS and stock market
investments are not illegal.24
A. Aleatory Contracts
The definition of an “aleatory contract” as “a contract whose execu-
tion or performance is contingent upon the occurrence of a particular
event or contingency or an uncertain (random) event beyond the con-
trol of either party”25 appears to apply as much to a home owner’s
insurance contract that pays following the unexpected destruction of
the home by fire as it does to a betting contract on the winner of next
year’s Super Bowl.26 The most common aleatory contracts are various
forms of insurance contracts. While common types of insurance (e.g.,
20. Id. at 162. A variety of federal statutes form a venerable obstacle to wide-
spread legal online gambling in the United States. See Ryan M. Rodenberg & Anas-
tasios Kaburakis, Legal and Corruption Issues in Sports Gambling, 23 J. LEGAL
ASPECTS SPORT 8, 10–17 (2013).
21. Beem & Mikler, supra note 18, at 172–73.
22. See Grange95, Drawing the Line Between Gambling and Finance: Part I–Meet
the Aleatory Contracts, CRAAKKER (Mar. 8, 2015, 11:16 PM) [hereinafter Aleatory
Contracts], http://craakker.blogspot.com/2015/03/drawing-line-between-gambling-
and.html [https://perma.cc/Y3DL-TDP3]. DFS games have been compared to a num-
ber of different activities, with stock trading being one these activities. See Dustin
Gouker, The Daily Fantasy Sports Analogy Game; Or Why DFS Is Not Like a Spell-
ing Bee, US POKER (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.uspoker.com/blog/daily-fantasy-sports-
analogies/13204 [https://perma.cc/8CFC-SGSX].
23. Id.
24. Norman Chad, Couch Slouch: Fantasy Sports Are as Much Gambling as Sports
Betting, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/couch-
slouch-fantasy-sports-are-as-much-gambling-as-sports-betting/2015/01/11/2b11f364-
99b9-11e4-a7ee-526210d665b4_story.html [https://perma.cc/3GFP-3JCS].
25. See Aleatory Contracts, supra note 22 (citing Aleatory Contract Law and Legal R
Definition, USLEGAL, http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/aleatory-contract (last visited
Feb. 17, 2019) [https://perma.cc/FG39-FU3V]).
26. See id.
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life, home, and auto) are widely known and accepted parts of organ-
ized social life, almost anything can be insured for a price.27 The pre-
mium paid in an insurance contract acts as a wager that an uncertain
event will happen.28 Additionally, insurance companies engage in the
practice of risk pooling—similar to a casino—whereby the total
amount of money is taken in and then used to pay out winners or
insureds who suffer a loss.29 Both the insurance company and casino
operate on the premise that the whole amount paid in will exceed the
amount that is distributed out.30
The historical differentiator between activities deemed economi-
cally beneficial and those deemed to be gambling is whether the activ-
ity balances offering financial hedging opportunities while not striding
too far into the depths of wild speculation.31 In Grigsby v. Russell, the
Supreme Court found that life insurance contracts held by third par-
ties create “a sinister counter-interest in having the life come to an
end.”32 The holding in Grigsby—that insurance policies were simply
pieces of property—has created unique market events such as the one
in the 1980s when AIDS patients sold their life insurance contracts to
speculators for more than the cash value of the policies but below the
amount of the policies’ death benefits.33
DFS contests represent a form of derivative contracts, as they in-
clude an activity whereby value is derived from an underlying sporting
event.34 The presence of chance in a given athlete’s performance on
any given day and the amount paid to enter a DFS contest render the
practice a form of aleatory contract.35 The separation of DFS as an
acceptable and marketable derivative of an underlying sporting
event—while sports gambling largely remains unacceptable and un-
27. See Grange95, Drawing the Line Between Gambling and Finance: Part
II–Insurance: Gambling on Catastrophe, CRAAKKER (Mar. 9, 2015, 7:18 AM) [here-
inafter Gambling on Catastrophe], http://craakker.blogspot.com/2015/03/drawing-line-
between-gambling-and_9.html [https://perma.cc/9687-D8FB].
28. Id.
29. Id. While beyond the scope of this Article, DFS companies who offer GPPs
are likely engaged in a form of risk pooling.  Indeed, in November 2018, one DFS
operator introduced a product called “pools.” See Eric Ramsey, New DraftKings
Sportsbook Pools Offer Jackpot-Style NJ Sports Betting Contests, LEGAL SPORTS REP.
(Nov. 8, 2018, 6:23 AM), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/25720/draftkings-sports
book-pools-launch/ [https://perma.cc/PGB2-NSL8].
30. Gambling on Catastrophe, supra note 27. R
31. See Grange95, Drawing the Line Between Gambling and Finance: Part
V–Hedgers and the Law, CRAAKKER (Mar. 25, 2015, 10:40 PM), http://craakker.blog
spot.com/2015/03/drawing-line-between-gambling-and_25.html [https://perma.cc/
SHN6-K95J].
32. Id. (quoting Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 145, 154–55 (1911)).
33. Id.
34. See Grange95, Drawing the Line Between Gambling and Finance: Part
IV–Derivatives and Daily Fantasy Sports, CRAAKKER (Mar. 11, 2015, 1:55 PM), http:/
/craakker.blogspot.com/2015/03/drawing-line-between-gambling-and_11.html [https://
perma.cc/8RWZ-CC78].
35. Id.
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marketable when other derivative products, including weather-based
products, are acceptable in a separate but related context—poses a
curious question as to what makes sports gambling historically differ-
ent in the eyes of the law.36 Other countries have allowed for the
emergence of sports betting markets that operate similarly to tradi-
tional stock exchanges with regard to regulation.37
A wide variety of commercial transactions involve elements of
chance and may be considered gambling to someone not familiar with
the transaction.38 Lawmakers have occasionally recognized the gam-
bling characteristics present in some non-gambling financial transac-
tions and activities as noted by exemptions in a number of federal
laws.39 A variety of investment strategies that are similar to gambling
include speculative investments, index funds with no physical delivery
date, and event futures.40 The Federal Trade Commission, for exam-
ple, initially referred to multi-level marketing platforms as pyramid
schemes and shut them down, but many of those platforms are now
regarded as legitimate businesses.41 In addition to these commercial
transactions, many poorly understood activities were initially classi-
fied as gambling but transitioned to accepted and legitimate forms of
investment when properly regulated.42
B. Regulation of Sports Gambling
The regulation of the sports gambling industry, including semanti-
cally differentiated products such as DFS, takes varying forms. The
complexity of shared federal and state power in the United States
presents an additional challenge to implementing a regulatory
model.43 While traditional bookmaker-style betting remains the most
prominent legal form of sports gambling in the United States, betting
exchanges are popular in other countries and allow a participant to
either set lines like a bookmaker or act as a bettor.44
36. Id.
37. See Mark Davies et al., Betfair.com: Five Technology Forces Revolutionize
Worldwide Wagering, 23 EUR. MGMT. J. 533 (2005).
38. See I. NELSON ROSE & MARTIN D. OWENS, JR., INTERNET GAMING LAW 46
(2d ed. 2009).
39. Id. at 60.
40. Id. at 44–49.
41. Id. at 45–46.
42. See MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISION MAKING 49 (2007).
43. See, e.g., Beem & Mikler, supra note 18. Indeed, the reliance on state laws as R
the primary source of law in determining whether an activity is gambling results in
different activities being legal in different states. See John T. Holden, Mailbag
Mythbusting: The Illegal Gambling Businesses Act and Sports Betting, SPORTS HAN-
DLE (June 18, 2018, 11:30 AM), https://sportshandle.com/mailbag-mythbusting-the-il
legal-gambling-businesses-act-and-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/R6SM-TREP].
44. See generally COLIN CAMERON, YOU BET THE BETFAIR STORY: HOW TWO
MEN CHANGED THE WORLD OF GAMBLING (2011).
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The rise of betting exchanges such as Betfair has been complicated
in some jurisdictions, in part, due to reluctance to depart from tradi-
tional market structures of bookmaking.45 The betting exchange mar-
ket represents an opportunity for transparency because price
movements provide information not present in the traditional book-
maker model where such movements are often more opaque to public
domain observers.46 A 2003 policy paper, published by the UK’s De-
partment for Culture Media and Sport (“DCMS”), proposed that bet-
ting exchanges be subjected to the rules of traditional licensed betting
operators in addition to six special rules: (1) the exchange operator
cannot initiate any bets; (2) customers cannot be known to other cus-
tomers;  (3) the exchange rules must be visible and disseminated; (4)
operators must consent to payment processing auditing by the licens-
ing commission; (5) operators must separate betting accounts and op-
erating accounts; and (6) exchanges are subject to the same regulation
as other gambling providers operating over the internet.47
While the proposed rules would provide transparency, the UK
DCMS recommended that licenses not be required for individuals set-
ting propositions on exchanges, thereby providing some protection to
the commercial viability of the product.48 British lawmakers rejected
the proposed regulations because they favored requiring licensure for
those proposing a betting transaction.49 While Betfair remains the
most recognized betting exchange globally, its efforts to expand have
been stifled in part by aggressive taxation schemes (Australia) and bu-
reaucratic indecision (United States).50 Betfair has struggled to enter
these legal markets even though its business structure has reframed
the conceptualization of sports wagering.
The Betfair peer-to-peer model that allows bettors to pick a loser—
comparable to taking a short position in a stock—was a meaningful
innovation absent in then-existing legal markets.51 As a result of
Betfair’s design—in not collecting the traditional vigorish on each wa-
45. See Niall O’Connor, A Short History of the Betting Exchange Industry, BET-
TINGMARKET (2017), http://www.bettingmarket.com/refraichir010388.htm [https://
perma.cc/A8QW-VMNJ].
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id. In 2013, Betfair applied for a license to offer exchange wagering on
horseracing in California, but the application was rejected. See Steve Anderson, Ex-
change Betting Rules Rejected by California Office of Administrative Law, DAILY
RACING FORM (Mar. 21, 2013, 1:25 PM), http://www.drf.com/news/exchange-betting-
rules-rejected-california-office-administrative-law [https://perma.cc/W3MV-6FSZ]. In
2015, Betfair was granted a license to operate a horseracing exchange in New Jersey.
See Katie Barlowe, Betfair Receives New Jersey Betting Exchange License, CA-
SINO.ORG (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.casino.org/news/betfair-receives-new-jersey-
betting-exchange-license [https://perma.cc/TU7T-Z3XV].
51. Davies et al., supra note 37, at 533. R
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ger—a bettor needs to succeed at a much lower rate to be profitable.52
The Betfair model may also increase transparency by placing the com-
pany in the role of facilitator instead of bookmaker.53 The emergence
of Betfair and other betting exchanges, such as Smarkets, has signaled
a transition from traditional conceptualizations of bookmaking.54
While Betfair remains a prominent market overseas, the United States
has remained cautious in the regulation of exchange-style sports wa-
gering. Nevertheless, American customers may already be participat-
ing in exchange-type markets given the structure of certain DFS head-
to-head contests.55
C. Sports Betting Funds
In addition to the use of exchange-based wagering as an alternative
or complimentary activity to stock market investing, several compa-
nies have developed entity-betting funds that “invest” in sport as an
asset class and frequently participate on betting exchanges.56 The
managers of the Galileo Managed Sports Fund marketed the fund as
the “first regulated sports fund in the world.”57  In January 2012, the
Galileo fund announced to investors that the fund lost $2.5 million
and was to be liquidated by creditors.58 The letter to investors attrib-
uted Galileo’s losses to “sheer bad luck.”59
The Priomha Group is another managed sports fund. In 2011, Pri-
omha noted that betting exchanges transformed sports betting to an
52. Id.
53. Id. at 538.
54. See O’Connor, supra note 45. See also SMARKETS, https://smarkets.com (last R
visited July 9, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6QRZ-QNXX].
55. Following its recent acquisition of FanDuel, Paddy Power Betfair signed a deal
to operate a variety of sportsbooks in New Jersey. The entry into the US market does
not presently include the same exchange-based sports betting platform that is availa-
ble in other jurisdictions. Dustin Gouker, Betfair US Inks NJ, NY Sports Betting
Deals; FanDuel ‘Very Likely’ to Be Used as Primary Brand, LEGAL SPORTS REP.
(June 7, 2018, 4:18 PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/21046/betfair-nj-and-ny-
sports-betting [https://perma.cc/BQ8A-QQ7P].
56. See Cullen D. Manning, Sports Betting After Sabermetrics: The Case for Apply-
ing PASPA Restrictions to Betting Groups, 3 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 261, 266–68
(2014). Indeed, Yale professor Tobias Moskowitz posited that sports betting is a
unique asset class. See Tobias J. Moskowitz, Asset Pricing and Sports Betting 35
(Working Paper No. 120, Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus. Research Paper Series, Paper No.
15-26, 2015).
57. See Galileo Managed Sports Fund, A Regulated Absolute Return Sports Fund –
Fund Fact Sheet, CENTAUR GALILEO 1–35 (July 8, 2010) (on file with Authors).
58. See Tony Manfred, The World’s First Sports-Betting Hedge Fund Has Col-
lapsed After Losing $2.5 Million, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 31, 2012, 10:32 AM), http://www
.businessinsider.com/sports-betting-hedge-fund-collapses-2012-1 [https://perma.cc/
SH9Q-V64P].
59. Id.
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investment opportunity and an alternative forum to manage risk.60
Sports funds, like Galileo and Priomha, often trade via betting ex-
changes—a strategy that mimics stock traders.
While Betfair remains the most prominent betting exchange, it was
predated by the Irish-based market known as Intrade. The Intrade
platform allowed traders to take either side of a proposition on nearly
any global event, paying the winner in increments of $10.61 Intrade
was lauded for its predictive accuracy, which included successfully out-
performing experts and traditional polls in determining the United
States Presidential Electoral College vote in 2008.62 In addition to
showing predictive accuracy, Intrade was able to attract a wide variety
of investors, including sophisticated Wall Street managers, profes-
sional gamblers, and followers of politics.63 The demise of Intrade oc-
curred shortly after the 2012 U.S. presidential election when the
CFTC accused Intrade of violating the agency’s regulations.64 In-
trade’s investors became aware of the company’s problems following
the death of top executive John Delaney when they discovered that
Delaney had amassed large amounts of personal debt.65 As Intrade’s
internal problems mounted, so too did the external forces of a CFTC
lawsuit filed in United States federal court.66 Ron Bernstein, a former
Intrade executive, noted that the Intrade strategy of “regulatory
avoidance isn’t a good business model.”67 While Intrade’s cessation of
operations resulted from a combination of internal and external pres-
sures, its predictive accuracy and market liquidity make a return of a
market-structured entity similar to Intrade likely.68
D. The Daily Fantasy Marketplace
Sports betting and trading in individual stocks are within the same
category of activities on a skill-chance continuum;69 both “are passive
wagers on the future actions of others.”70 Stock prices and sports wa-
gers are influenced by a multitude of external factors beyond the bet-
tor’s control, regardless of the amount of research informing the
60. See The Priomha Grp., CLONEY Multi-Sport Investment Fund, AUSTRALIAN
SPORTS BETTING (Dec. 2011), http://www.aussportsbetting.com/files/CLONEY_
Fund_Factsheet_Dec1_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/H77M-M3AN].
61. Andrew Rice, The Fall of Intrade and the Business of Betting on Real Life,
BUZZFEED (Feb. 20, 2014, 11:25 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/andrewrice/the-fall-
of-intrade-and-the-business-of-betting-on-real-life#.lv1LKVAwJ [https://perma.cc/
TJE3-3UUC].
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Hurt, supra note 4, at 378. R
70. Id. at 387.
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bettor’s selection.71 Like a bookmaker, most casual stock investors
buy and sell stocks through a market-maker.72 Similar to poker play-
ers and sports bettors, the investors who maintain consistent profit-
ability are largely professional.73 DFS operators have been positioning
the contests they offer as games of skill.74 The DFS model tries to
position the contests to be skill-based in order to avoid some state
gambling laws.75 The skill versus chance dichotomy does not establish
legality in all states, but supports a plurality of states choosing not to
consider an activity as gambling. The challenge for DFS operators is
that DFS requires less skilled players to play and lose against more
skilled players in order to maintain a viable market.76 Conservative
estimates, based on one analysis, showed that skilled participants won
more than 70% of the time against less skilled opponents.77 As the
number of fraud-related private lawsuits against DFS companies rose,
additional studies showing that only a small number of individuals
consistently win may make it difficult for DFS companies to attract
new participants and, in turn, establishing a sustainable business
model.78
The exchange-based format that has become a prominent form of
sports betting in Europe is not operating with the same level of promi-
nence in the United States. While this may be explained by the rela-
71. Id.
72. Id. at 389. A market maker is capable of both selling and buying shares at
specific prices. See Joshua Kennon, What Is a Market Maker and How Do They Make
Money, BALANCE, http://www.thebalance.com/what-is-a-market-maker-and-how-do-
they-make-money-4053753 (last visited Dec. 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7R8B-YBY2].
73. See Hurt, supra note 4, at 391. R
74. See Ed Miller & Daniel Singer, For Daily Fantasy Sports Operators, the Curse
of Too Much Skill, SPORTS BUS. J. (July 27, 2015), https://www.sportsbusiness
daily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/07/27/Opinion/From-the-Field-of-Fantasy-Sports.aspx
[https://perma.cc/D8AB-Y3J3].
75. See Thomas J. Miles et al., Is Texas Hold ’Em a Game of Chance? A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 101 GEO. L.J. 581, 588 (2013).
76. See Miller & Singer, supra note 74. R
77. See Ana Swanson, The Future of Fantasy Sports Hinges on Whether Winners
Are Skilled — Or Just Lucky, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/19/the-future-of-fantasy-sports-depends-on-whe
ther-winners-are-skilled-or-just-lucky [https://perma.cc/SU4L-M63S].
78. While a number of DFS companies have cited and commissioned studies at-
testing to the level of skill in their games, all known studies have been based on a
potentially flawed methodology, examining performance over time. Given that the
“D” in DFS stands for “Daily,” a longitudinal analysis seems ill-suited as each DFS
contest occurs in isolation, where even a total novice could beat a more skilled indi-
vidual who has devoted his or her life to DFS. Federal authorities investigating DFS
companies could probe whether individual contests constitute games of skill or
chance, as opposed to a longitudinal analysis of whether more skilled players succeed
at a higher rate over time. The fact that in any individual contest on any given day any
DFS player can win was acknowledged by Professor Anette Hosoi during a 2016
panel at the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference. See 42 Analytics, SSAC16: Luck
vs. Skill: Gambling Analytics, YOUTUBE (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=com6Q1nHiWVc&t=1s [https://perma.cc/9TQC-ZL2T].
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tively nascent sports betting expansion following the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Murphy v. NCAA,79 the possibility that certain DFS contests
may be operating contrary to federal law and regulations was raised.80
The DFS contests that have grown in popularity of late are distinctly
different from season-long leagues because the DFS contests possess
daily market action—a feature that is regulated in “almost all” other
markets.81 Many DFS contests use mark-to-market scoring to estimate
current value, which is similar to the accounting methods used by
products on futures exchanges.82 When estimating an athlete’s fantasy
value on a given night, DFS companies assign a present estimate of
the player’s worth, as opposed to traditional scoring methods based on
accrual scoring that requires previous events to complete prior to as-
signing value.83 Neither the presence of mark-to-market scoring nor
daily market action render an activity an illegal exchange on its own;
however, several other features of DFS games may render them sus-
ceptible to the regulations of financial regulators. These features in-
clude matching buyers with sellers and offering sports-based
derivatives, which the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010
(“Dodd–Frank Act”) may classify as prohibited event contracts.84
III. THE ROLE AND EVOLUTION OF THE CFTC
The purpose of financial market regulation was to provide investors
with access to relevant information in order to make informed deci-
sions.85 Derivatives are items that develop their value from an under-
79. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (striking
down the partial federal sports betting ban in the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act as unconstitutional).
80. See generally Kevin Braig et al., Unsure Bet: The Future of Daily Fantasy Ex-
change Wagering, 17 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 499 (2013).
81. Id. at 499.
82. Id. at 503. Mark-to-market valuation attempts to provide an appraisal of value
based on “current market value” as opposed to “book value.” The term was coined by
Professor Matt Holden of the University of Nevada Las Vegas and can be used inter-
changeably with “fair value accounting.” See Mark to Market Accounting, Definition,
NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/m/mark-to-market-accounting
(last visited Dec. 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/V3B2-F72Z].
83. Braig et al., supra note 80, at 503–04. Many DFS games confine users to a R
salary-cap whereby DFS players have to select athletes to fill their teams while com-
posing a roster of players with company-established values that does not exceed a
certain level.
84. This very concept of matching buyers and sellers was mentioned by a FanDuel
executive in a 2016 interview with PBS Frontline. See Breslow, supra note 1. (“We R
make our money as any other marketplace business does. We match effectively buy-
ers and sellers together. What we are is similar to eBay. Where their role was to
facilitate the auction of goods, our role is to frankly bring people together that want
to compete in the same game.”).
85. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?—
Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital
Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 987, 987 (1992).
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lying security, asset, or index.86 Derivatives exist in two types: futures
and option contracts. These differ in that a futures contract creates an
obligation to deliver the underlying commodity for a certain price at a
certain date, whereas an option contract does not “create delivery ob-
ligations unless and until the option-holder exercises the option.”87
Commodities markets provide three material benefits for investors:
“(1) risk allocation, (2) price discovery—which results in more accu-
rate pricing of the underlying commodity, and (3) a more accessible
source of pricing information.”88 Options on these underlying com-
modities then present a meaningful opportunity for investment firms
to hedge against the risk of the underlying product.89 Additionally,
derivative markets generate useful information for allocating re-
sources and reducing the transaction costs for the trading of financial
instruments.90 While DFS and sports gambling presently may appear,
on the surface, to be outside the regulatory scope of the CFTC and
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), both agencies have
historically sought to encourage development of new financial instru-
ments, which could potentially place DFS or sports gambling within
the agencies’ scope in the future.91
The emergence of new financial products has sometimes led to con-
flicts between the SEC and CFTC over regulatory authority.92 Two
types of investors typically trade in the futures market: (1) hedgers
seeking to lessen the risk of other investments; and (2) speculators
seeking a large profit without any intention of taking future delivery
of a product.93 A 1982 accord between the CFTC and SEC deter-
mined the regulatory jurisdiction of each body.94 While controversial
issues remain regarding where the SEC’s jurisdiction ends and the
CFTC’s jurisdiction begins, the CFTC assumed jurisdiction over fu-
tures derivatives.95 While the CFTC and SEC have many similarities,
the CFTC lacks the broad independence of the SEC and is tightly
constrained by budget allocations.96 According to one researcher, the
CFTC has been unable or unwilling to define the exact contours of its
86. Id. at 989.
87. Id. at 990.
88. Id. at 1007.
89. Id. at 1010.
90. Id. at 1008–09.
91. Id. at 1021.
92. See generally John D. Benson, Ending the Turf Wars: Support for a CFTC/SEC
Consolidation, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1175 (1991).
93. Id. at 1178.
94. Id. at 1187–88. The CFTC was awarded jurisdiction of “all futures contracts,
options on futures, stock index futures and options on stock index futures, while the
SEC was to have authority over options on securities and options on stock indices.”
Id. at 1188.
95. See generally Alton B. Harris, The CFTC and Derivative Products: Purposeful
Ambiguity and Jurisdictional Reach, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1117 (1996).
96. Id.; Benson, supra note 92, at 1717–18. R
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regulatory authority in the derivatives market, often issuing ambigu-
ous rulings so as to not offend either side of disputes over the particu-
lars of its authority.97
Different congressional committees oversee the SEC and CFTC.
The CFTC’s connection to traditional agricultural-based commodities
has occasionally caused disputes with the SEC over new derivatives
products.98 Certain financial innovators have crafted products so as to
lower regulatory costs by having the products regulated by either the
SEC or CFTC.99 The derivatives markets regulated by the CFTC re-
flect new information faster than markets trading on the actual under-
lying commodities, meaning this information may provide an
advantage to sophisticated investors.100
A. Old Markets, New Products
The challenge in creating new markets focused on non-traditional
financial products under CFTC jurisdiction is either: (1) overcoming
the relative regulatory hurdles established by the CFTC, or (2) seek-
ing a “special exemption from regulation” such as a no-action let-
ter.101 Another option may involve seeking an existing exchange to list
new financial products.102 Although derivatives received a large por-
tion of the blame for the 2008 financial crisis due to their complexity,
derivatives may present a meaningful opportunity to hedge against
risk.103 Provided that a product falls within the definition of “com-
modity”—and conversely does not fall within the list of excluded com-
modities—the regulation of the commodity or its derivatives falls
within the CFTC’s jurisdiction.104 Off-exchange trading in excluded
commodities typically may only occur between “eligible contract par-
ticipants,” which are classically thought of as financial institutions.105
97. Harris, supra note 95, at 1119. R
98. Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation,
14 YALE J. REG. 279, 382 (1997).
99. Id. at 383.
100. See Timothy E. Lynch, Gambling by Another Name; The Challenge of Purely
Speculative Derivatives, 17 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 67, 81–82 (2011). See also Ryan
Tracy & Scott Patterson, Fast Traders Are Getting Data From SEC Seconds Early,
WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/fast-traders-are-getting-data-from-sec-
seconds-early-1414539997 (last updated Oct. 29, 2014, 2:18 PM) [https://perma.cc/
WU6T-PNR9].
101. Tom W. Bell, Gambling for the Good, Trading for the Future: The Legality of
Markets in Science Claims, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 159, 169 (2002).
102. See id. at 169–70 (considering the creation of a new marketplace for science
claim coupons by existing exchanges regulated by the CFTC).
103. See Jeremy A. Gogol, The Case for Domestic Box Office Receipt Derivatives,
14 CHAP. L. REV. 415, 415 (2011).
104. See David R. Overstreet et al., Regulated Wagering on Events Markets: Analy-
sis, WORLD ONLINE GAMBLING L. REP. 9 (Aug. 2008) (on file with Authors).
105. The CFTC glossary notes that “[t]his classification permits these persons to
engage in specific transactions (such as trading on a swap execution facility or enter-
ing into a bilateral swap trade) not directly available to non-eligible contract partici-
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Additionally, the CFTC legislation contains a provision specifically
governing event contracts, which prohibits listing transactions that the
commission deems contrary to public interest or in violation of other
enumerated provisions.106 The broad definition of “commodity,”
under the 1974 statute, includes “specific goods delineated in the
statement (e.g. wheat, corn) and ‘all other goods and articles . . . and
all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery
are presently or in the future dealt in.’”107 While the CFTC has previ-
ously acted to shut down Intrade and other markets operating in vio-
lation of the agency’s regulations, it has taken no public action against
a DFS operator as of January 1, 2019.
B. Illegal Exchange Activities
The United States’ market regulation system has been one of
shared regulatory authority between the federal government and the
regulated industries themselves.108 In the late 1800s, “bucket shops”
began to emerge as a result of prestigious exchanges excluding less
well-known brokerage houses.109 Into the early 1900s, the power of
bucket shops increased to the point that they dominated major ex-
changes, including the Chicago Board of Trade.110 Futures trading
drew its legitimacy from the Supreme Court case Board of Trade of
Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co.111 In Board of Trade, two com-
modity exchanges disputed the shared use of “continuous quotations
of prices on sales of grain and provisions for future delivery . . . .”112 In
contract with several telegraph companies, the plaintiff collected in-
formation on pricing from the trading floor and then disseminated the
quotes.113 The plaintiff’s provisioning of information to the telegraph
companies was on the condition that the information would not be
provided to bucket shops, in which case the information may be “used
pants, i.e., retail customers.” See Eligible Contract Participant, CFTC (2016), https://
cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/index.htm (citing 7
U.S.C. § 1a(18)). Limited exceptions are made for off-exchange trading of foreign
currencies provided that the party offering the transaction is a financial institution.
See Mark D. Young et al., Bitcoins and the Blockchain: The CFTC Takes Notice of
Virtual Currencies, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 2 (Jan. 2016),
https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/Bitcoins_and_the_Block
chain_The_CFTC_Takes_Notice_of_Virtual_Currencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUV9-
5NCQ].
106. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(5)(c)(i)–(vi) (2018).
107. See Overstreet et al., supra note 104, at 9. R
108. See Jake Keaveny, In Defense of Market Self-Regulation—An Analysis of the
History of Futures Regulation and the Trend Toward Demutualization, 70 BROOK. L.
REV. 1419, 1419 (2005).
109. Id. at 1423. Keaveny stated that bucket shops were titled as such because they
“bucketed” their clients’ money, as opposed to depositing the money in banks. See id.
110. Id. at 1423–24.
111. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905).
112. Id. at 245.
113. Id. at 245–46.
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as a basis for bets or illegal contracts.”114 The defendants, presumed
by the Supreme Court to be bucket shop operators, defended against
the suit by arguing that the plaintiff’s arguments were immaterial be-
cause no contractual relationship existed between the plaintiff and de-
fendant.115 In giving legitimacy to the futures market system, Justice
Holmes noted that the fact that a physical commodity does not actu-
ally change hands in a majority of transactions does not render the
activity illegal.116
The use of the term “bucket shop” evolved to refer to stock selling
operations that never execute buy or sell orders, instead the firm sim-
ply holds onto the money without ever investing it.117 In Gatewood v.
North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that a North Carolina law
that criminalized the operation of a business that traded futures was
unconstitutional.118 Bucket shop laws are often categorized along with
state gambling laws. In Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, the defendant
argued that the more than $25 million he owed to Salomon Forex was
an unenforceable debt because “foreign currency futures [must] be
traded exclusively on exchanges designated by the CFTC and that op-
tions be traded either on such exchanges or on securities exchanges
designated by the [SEC].”119 Tauber was unsuccessful in his challenges
to the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) exemption for foreign cur-
rency and associated options and futures contracts being traded off-
exchange.120 Tauber was also unsuccessful in alleging that his transac-
tions with Salomon Forex violated New York state bucket shop laws,
with the Fourth Circuit noting that “[t]he New York statute does not
ban legally enforceable trades settled by future transactions, but only
sham transactions.”121 Similarly, in Dunn v. CFTC, the Supreme
Court held that the CFTC had authority to regulate off-exchange op-
tions to buy or sell foreign currency.122
In CFTC v. American Board of Trade, Inc., the CFTC brought suit
alleging that the defendant was engaged in transactions that required
registration as an exchange.123 The American Board of Trade argued
that the CFTC only had jurisdiction over commodity futures options,
as opposed to options on the commodities themselves.124 The Second
114. Id. at 246.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 246–47.
117. See Julie M. Allen, Kicking the Bucket Shop: The Model State Commodity
Code as the Latest Weapon in the State Administrator’s Anti-Fraud Arsenal, 42 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 889, 892 n.15 (1985).
118. Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1906).
119. Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 973 (4th Cir. 1993).
120. Id. at 977.
121. Id. at 978.
122. Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 470–71 (1997).
123. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Bd. of Trade, 803 F.2d 1242, 1244
(2d Cir. 1986).
124. Id. at 1244.
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Circuit deemed the American Board of Trade’s interpretation of the
CEA to be without merit, in addition to a First Amendment claim that
the court agreed was “conclusory, vague, and general.”125 Likewise in
CFTC v. Baragosh, the CFTC filed a complaint alleging that the de-
fendant had operated a “sham futures exchange.”126 Baragosh and
others operated a company called Noble Wealth that promised train-
ees they would become futures traders with an investment of
$10,000.127 Noble Wealth’s managers created an elaborate ruse
whereby traders believed they were trading with a licensed Hong
Kong currency brokerage, when in fact the Court noted there was no
evidence that Baragosh and the other Noble Wealth managers did an-
ything with the traders’ money.128 The defendants were charged with
misappropriating clients’ money, “bucketing” customer orders, and
offering to sell commodity futures off-exchange.129 The Fourth Circuit
held that it was Congress’s intent to “extend the [CEA]’s regulatory
protections to previously uncovered futures markets.”130 In addition,
Congress also intended to ban futures trading outside of contracts
markets, ban bucket shops, and require contract markets to adopt
rules against fraud.
In SEC v. Banc De Binary, a Cypriot company without a license in
the United States allowed investors to “bet[ ]” whether a particular
stock would rise or fall by a specific date.131 The Court noted that
unlike traditional stock options that allow an individual to purchase
actual shares at a later date, so-called binary options contain no such
right and “are in substance pure gambling bets.”132 The district court
observed that the SEC may assert jurisdiction over security options
that are cash-settled versus delivery-settled.133 The SEC’s claims
against Banc de Binary were supplemented by CFTC allegations that,
from May 2011 to May 2013, Banc de Binary “solicited and permitted
U.S. customers to buy and sell options betting on the prices of wheat,
oil, platinum, sugar, coffee, corn, foreign currency pairs, and stock
indices.”134
125. Id. at 1249, 1253 (citations omitted).
126. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Baragosh, 278 F.3d 319, 321 (4th Cir.
2002).
127. Id. at 322.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 323.
130. Id. at 328.
131. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Banc de Binary, Ltd., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1231 (D.
Nev. 2013).
132. Id. at 1234.
133. Id. at 1235 (citing Caiola v. Citibank N.A., N.Y., 295 F.3d 312, 326–27 (2d Cir.
2002)).
134. Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Charges “Predic-
tion Market” Proprietor Banc de Binary With Violating CFTC’s Off-Exchange Op-
tions Trading Ban and Operating as an Unregistered Futures Commission Merchant
(June 6, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6602-13 [https://
perma.cc/XHV5-MQ6R].
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-3\TWL302.txt unknown Seq: 18  6-MAY-19 13:13
636 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
On September 29, 2005, the CFTC obtained a consent order against
the Trade Exchange Network (“TEN”), which would later become the
parent company of prediction market Intrade.135 The CFTC alleged
that between January 2003 and May 2005, TEN offered United States
residents the ability to trade commodity options “not excepted or ex-
empted” by the CFTC.136 The consent order noted that TEN operated
numerous websites on its platform from Ireland, including
“www.Tradesports.com, www.Intrade.com, and TradebetX.com, as
well as the now-deactivated website, www.Wallstreetsports.com.”137
In the relevant period, the CFTC alleged that between one-third and
four-tenths of TEN’s customers were based in the United States.138
Without admitting to any specific allegations, TEN agreed to “cease
and desist from violating the provisions of the Act and Commission
Regulations that it has been found to have violated,” pay a fine of
$150,000, and comply with the order’s undertakings.139
On November 26, 2012, the CFTC brought additional charges
against Intrade and TEN, alleging that TEN breached the terms of the
previous agreement and filed false statements with the CFTC while
continuing to offer off-exchange options.140  The CFTC filed this com-
plaint in federal court in the District of Columbia.141 The CFTC com-
plaint alleged that between 2007 and 2012, Intrade and TEN violated
the 2005 consent order and the CEA as modified by the Dodd–Frank
Act.142 The CFTC argued that despite the 2005 consent agreement,
TEN, through Intrade, continued to offer and execute trades by
United States-based customers on binary options, including future
gold and oil prices and the United States unemployment rate.143 In
2014, TEN and Intrade were ordered by the CFTC to produce a series
of documents to the CFTC and to respond to interrogatories.144 In
August 2015, TEN was held in civil contempt by the District Court for
135. See In re Matter of Trade Exchange Network, CFTC No. 05-14, at *3–4 (Sept.
29, 2005).
136. Id. at *1.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *2.
139. Id. at *3.
140. See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Charges Ire-
land-Based “Prediction Market” Proprietors Intrade and TEN With Violating the
CFTC’s Off-Exchange Options Trading Ban and Filing False Forms With the CFTC
(Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6423-12 [https://
perma.cc/8DER-LHF6].
141. See Complaint at 2–3, 13–14, 16–17, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Trade Exch. Network, Ltd., 1:12-CV-01902, at 2–3, 13–14, 16–17, (D.D.C. Nov. 26,
2012).
142. Id. at 2–3.
143. Id. at 3–4.
144. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Trade Exch. Network, Ltd., 61 F.
Supp. 3d. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2014) (“TEN and Intrade must produce all documents respon-
sive to the CFTC’s requests for production and also complete their responses to the
CFTC’s interrogatories . . . .”).
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the District of Columbia for failing to comply with the 2014 order.145
In November 2015, the district court awarded the CFTC attorneys’
fees in connection with the 2014 order to comply.146 The TEN matter
has lingered for years, with many procedural matters preventing final
disposition, including the company’s liquidation in Ireland.147
The CFTC also regulates through advisory correspondence. On De-
cember 19, 2011, Timothy G. McDermott—General Counsel and
Chief Regulatory Officer of the North American Derivatives Ex-
change (“NADEX”)—sent a letter to CFTC Secretary David Stawick
requesting to offer five products tied to United States Congressional
and Presidential elections.148 McDermott noted that NADEX is a
fully registered and compliant organization that is licensed by the
CFTC as a derivatives clearing organization.149 NADEX has histori-
cally offered traditional binary derivative options and has occasionally
offered event contracts including options on corporate mergers and
housing prices.150 McDermott argued that political event contracts are
not prohibited by specific regulations adopted in the Dodd–Frank
Act’s section 745, which prohibits event contracts on terrorism, war,
assassination, gaming, an activity that is unlawful under any state or
federal law, or an event the Commission determines is contrary to the
public interest.151 In response to McDermott’s request, the CFTC held
a ninety-day review of the proposal to allow the offering of event de-
rivatives by an entity other than the Iowa Electronic Markets, which
had been operating for over a decade pursuant to a CFTC no-action
letter.
On February 16, 2012, McDermott wrote to Stawick for a second
time, noting that McDermott believed that NADEX structured its po-
145. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Trade Exch. Network, Ltd., 117 F.
Supp. 3d 22, 29 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]he Court holds defendants TEN and Intrade in
civil contempt of Court for violating the Court’s June 24, 2014 Order.”).
146. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Trade Exch. Network, Ltd., 159 F.
Supp. 3d 5, 10 (D.D.C. 2015) (granting in part the plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’
fees).
147. See Plaintiff’s Notice to the Court Regarding Status Update Provided by De-
fendants’ Irish Liquidator and Statement by Liquidator That It Would Be Useful to
Have a Ruling as Soon as Possible on Plaintiff’s Request for a Civil Monetary Penalty
at 1–2, CFTC v. Trade Exch. Network, Ltd., No. 1:12-cv-01902-RCL (D.D.C. Apr. 16,
2018).
148. See Letter from Timothy G. McDermott, Gen. Counsel and Chief Regulatory
Officer of NADEX to David Stawick, Sec’y of the Comm’n Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Comm’n (Dec. 19, 2011) (on file with authors).
149. Id. at 2.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 4. See also Ryan Rodenberg, Prediction Markets Remain ‘Promising,’
But What About Sports?, SPORTS HANDLE (Feb. 8, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://sportshan-
dle.com/prediction-markets-remain-promising-but-what-about-sports [https://perma.
cc/6U37-K9V8]. Section 745 of the Dodd–Frank Act presents several important ques-
tions regarding the validity of the provision in consideration of the First Amendment
doctrines of void for vagueness and over breadth; however, those issues are beyond
the scope of this Article.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-3\TWL302.txt unknown Seq: 20  6-MAY-19 13:13
638 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
litical derivatives to comply with the CEA and the Dodd–Frank
Act.152 McDermott noted the importance of having a regulated mar-
ketplace where political derivatives may be offered.153 In response to
a series of questions submitted by the CFTC’s Stawick, McDermott
pinpointed that the term “gaming” in Dodd–Frank may present
problems if it applied to the act of trading contracts, as opposed to the
underlying event.154 McDermott argued that “gaming” refers to sport-
ing events, such as the Super Bowl.155 To support the contention that
the proposed activities are not illegal under state or federal law, Mc-
Dermott observed that the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act (“UIGEA”) exempts transactions under the CEA from the defi-
nition of “bets” or “wagers.”156 McDermott further noted that
NADEX’s proposed offering was distinct from that of a bookmaker’s
offering because, unlike a bookmaker who sets the price for participa-
tion, NADEX offers open markets where buyers and sellers meet and
discover market prices at which they can trade.157
On April 2, 2012, the CFTC issued an order prohibiting NADEX
from offering political event derivative contracts.158 The CFTC deter-
mined that “betting” on elections is forbidden under various state
laws and that several state gambling definitions for “bet” and “wager”
specifically include political events.159 The CFTC further noted that
152. See Letter from Timothy McDermott to David Stawick, Re Industry Filing IF
12-003-90-day Review of NADEX’s Proposed Political Event Derivatives Contracts
(Feb. 16, 2012) [hereinafter NADEX Comment Letter], https://www.cftc.gov/sites/de
fault/files/stellent/groups/public/@rulesandproducts/documents/ifdocs/nadexltr021612.
pdf [https://perma.cc/V8S2-VTFB].
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. at 4.
155. Id. at 5.
156. Id. at 6. UIGEA similarly exempts certain fantasy games from the definition
of “bets” or “wagers.” See John T. Holden, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforce-
ment Act and the Exemption for Fantasy Sports, 28 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 97,
99–100 (2018).
157. NADEX Comment Letter, supra note 152, at 6. R
158. See In re Self-Certification by North American Derivatives Exchange, Inc., of
Political Event Derivatives Contracts and Related Rule Amendments under Part 40
of the Regulations of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Order Prohibiting
the Listing or Trading of Political Event Contracts, CFTC (Apr. 2, 2012) [hereinafter
CFTC Order on Political Events Contracts].
159. Id. at 2. The CFTC cited various state statutes in support of the contention
that “betting” on elections violates state law including: 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/28-1 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-5-10 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-
28-01 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-21(a)(2) (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-33-1 (West 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-19-90 (2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 47.02(a)(2) (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 287-D:1(VI) (2011); and WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 945.01(1) (West 2011). See id. at 2, 2–3 & nn.1–2. By citing to various
state laws in the course of ruling on the NADEX proposal, the CFTC demonstrated
the expansive reach of its potential authority in the DFS context. Such breadth is
particularly illustrative in Texas, where two DFS operators are conducting business
despite a contrary memorandum from the Texas Attorney General about the legality
of the operators’ fantasy contest under Texas state law. See Chris Grove, FanDuel
Returns to Texas Fantasy Sports Market After Two-Year Absence, LEGAL SPORTS
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increased uncertainty in political elections prevents sufficient hedging
opportunities.160 The CFTC denied the application because political
event contracts constitute gaming under the CEA as amended by the
Dodd–Frank Act and are contrary to the public interest.161 However,
the CFTC did not elaborate on what constitutes gaming under the
statute.162
The CFTC has never specifically brought a public action against a
sports derivatives dealer; however, the CFTC did not rule out the pos-
sibility it has jurisdiction over sports derivatives markets under its
2005 complaint against TEN and its various sports-based sub-compo-
nents.163 Federal courts have interpreted the CFTC’s jurisdiction
broadly including authority over off-exchange currency trading and
offenders located outside the United States availing themselves of
American customers. Nevertheless, for determining whether the
CFTC has jurisdiction over certain DFS contests—particularly match-
ing up two participants—the relevant likely threshold question is
whether certain DFS contests are prohibited event contracts similar to
the proposed political offerings of NADEX. The absence of any deci-
sions—excluding the NADEX and Intrade decisions—interpreting a
substantially similar product to DFS head-to-head contests suggests
that the most relevant case law relates to event futures contracts of-
fered by NADEX and Intrade. Accordingly, Section IV examines sev-
eral popular DFS sites in an effort to determine whether these sites
are subject to the CFTC’s jurisdiction.
REP. (Aug. 28, 2018, 6:53 AM), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/23349/fanduel-tex
as-return/ [https://perma.cc/LV4P-FBDH].
160. Id. at 3.
161. Id. at 4. While the CFTC deemed the NADEX offering of political event con-
tracts contrary to the public interest and gaming contrary to section 745 of the
Dodd–Frank Act, in 2014 the CFTC granted a no-action letter to New Zealand’s Vic-
toria University. See Vincent McGonagle, Director, Div. of Mkt. Oversight, CFTC
No-Action Letter, CFTCLTR No. 14-130 (Oct. 29, 2014) [hereinafter CFTC No-Ac-
tion Letter to Quigley], available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/
public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/14-130.pdf [https://perma.cc/VEW7-V78E].
The CFTC’s no-action letter to Victoria University facilitated the emergence of
PredictIt, a Washington, DC-based prediction market. See Ryan Rodenberg, How to
Speculate—With Real Money—On the Supreme Court Sports Betting Case, SPORTS
HANDLE (Feb. 7, 2018, 9:45 AM), https://sportshandle.com/supreme-court-sports-bet
ting-speculate-real-money [https://perma.cc/V3U9-XAJL]. See also Ryan Rodenberg,
Why Sports Prediction Markets Are Like Onions and Box Office Movie Receipts,
SPORTS HANDLE (Feb. 9, 2018, 8:45 AM), https://sportshandle.com/sports-prediction-
markets-onions-box-office-receipts [https://perma.cc/VF8F-PT7W].
162. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n Order on Political Events Contracts,
supra note 158, at 4. R
163. See In re Matter of Trade Exchange Network, CFTC No. 05-14, at *3–4 (Sept.
29, 2005).
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IV. DAILY FANTASY SPORTS WEBSITES AND PROHIBITED
ACTIVITIES
DFS operators offer several types of DFS contests, including GPPs,
head-to-head contests, and 50/50s.164 Among the varieties, head-to-
head contests offered by nearly all DFS providers are the most similar
to an exchange transaction.165 While many companies do not provide
a complete description of how their head-to-head contests operate,
the basic mechanics of the games can be deduced from the “Fre-
quently Asked Questions” section of the DraftKings website.166 In
head-to-head contests, an individual can either propose a contest or
accept to participate in a contest.167 In many unfilled/unmatched
head-to-head contests,168 an individual may cancel the offer, or the
contest will automatically terminate if not filled by a designated time;
however, once a contest is filled, the offeror must execute the agree-
ment by participating in the contest.169 Some sites also allow offerors
to limit the number of times an offeree may accept an individual con-
testant’s open offer.170 In a manner similar to an exchange platform,
the DFS site facilitates contests that may represent a sports binary
derivative product whereby the offeree’s acceptance acts as a short
position against the offeror’s offer that the offeror will receive a
greater number of fantasy contest points.171
Some websites appear to offer a service whereby the site provider
matches two users seeking to participate in a head-to-head fantasy
contest. DraftKings noted that its employees are forbidden from par-
ticipating on the site, and employees of other sites using inside infor-
mation are not allowed to utilize that information on DraftKings’s
site; however, there is no specific mention of non-employee insiders
using proprietary information to compete on the site.172 While there
are a variety of contests for users, those with the most evident connec-
164. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, DRAFTKINGS, https://www.draftkings.
com/help/faq (last visited July 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/SEN6-EWFD].
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. In a case involving a website titled “Betcha.com,” the Washington State
Gambling Commission required the operator of a peer-to-peer betting site to shut
down for violating state gambling laws. See Ryan Rodenberg, ‘eBay Meets Facebook
in Las Vegas’: The Fascinating Story of Betcha.com, ESPN (Aug. 25, 2015), http://
www.espn.go.com/chalk/story/_/id/13506773/betting-bookmaking-curious-case-betcha
com-chalk [https://perma.cc/WX3H-R83H].
168. Unfilled contests are those which do not have two competitors.
169. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 164. R
170. Id.
171. A short position would be taken because otherwise an individual would essen-
tially end up wagering against their own sports derivative line-up.
172. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 164 (expand “Policy on Employee R
Participation”). Employee participation has proven thorny for DFS companies, as
there is a challenge in having passionate employees and maintaining both the integrity
of the underlying fantasy contests and, perhaps more important, the appearance of
integrity. See Holden et al., supra note 13, at 16–17. R
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tion to securities laws are the head-to-head contests that mimic peer-
to-peer stock markets and betting exchanges.173
Some sites enable players to craft their own contests that other
users can join.174 FanDuel, for instance, explicitly stated that head-to-
head contests will not “take place without two willing competitors.”175
Additionally, FanDuel noted that once two head-to-head contestants
are matched, the contestants cannot cancel the agreement.176 In addi-
tion to restricting the ability of users to cancel a matched head-to-
head contract, some DFS sites explicitly note that the company
reserves the right to cancel contests at the company’s discretion.177
Other DFS sites use head-to-head contests that are entirely user-initi-
ated, in much the same way that an individual initiates an offer for a
sale of shares on a personal brokerage account, which then connects a
buyer with the seller’s offer.178 FanDuel’s website noted that head-to-
head contests are always against other users and that if an opponent
does not get matched by closing time, the FanDuel system will attempt
to match competitors.179 The FanDuel system that links two customers
is quite similar to an exchange bid-matching system whereby two will-
ing users are matched at a set contest price.
FanDuel, for example, appears to explicitly attempt to match up un-
filled head-to-head contests.180 Some DFS sites allow users to view
offers to accept a match-up, while a fewer number of sites allow users
to propose the terms of a transaction—similar to an individual seeking
to unload a financial product on a market. Given the similarities to
several features of regulated financial markets and investment trans-
actions, what follows is an analysis of the head-to-head contests of-
fered and an analysis of whether any of the fantasy contests bear
sufficient similarity to the activities that have resulted in enforcement
actions. The analysis will conclude that DFS sites may need to be con-
173. In addition, there is the possibility that multi-participant tournaments may in-
voke investment and securities laws if it were determined that the participants were
utilizing a non-participant’s money and acting as an investment advisor; however,
there is presently insufficient evidence that this practice is taking place. Though be-
yond the scope of this Article, large contests such as GPPs and 50/50s may violate
some state laws against gambling pools.
174. Id.
175. See Rules, FANDUEL, https://www.fanduel.com/rules (expand “Unfilled Con-
tests”) (last visited Dec. 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/UP8H-63YR].
176. Id. (expand “Contest Cancellation”).
177. FanDuel noted that contest cancellations would be a rare event typically re-
served for widespread concerns about contest integrity. See id.
178. See Matt Hevia, FanDuel Tips: Contest Type Explanations, FANDUEL (Aug.
29, 2014), http://www.fanduel.com/insider/2014/08/29/game-explanations [https://
perma.cc/PTY6-UQX8].
179. Id.
180. See Rules, supra note 175. R
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cerned with federal agencies beyond those who have already com-
menced investigations.181
A. Do DFS Sites Fall Under the Purview of the CFTC?
The threshold question in determining whether any of DFS sites
may be subject to the jurisdiction of a regulator is whether DFS con-
tests fall within the CFTC’s regulatory scope. The base level analysis
examines whether a head-to-head contest on a DFS site constitutes an
event contract. Overstreet et al. observed that the CFTC views event
contracts as “possessing the characteristics of both options and fu-
tures.”182 Commonly structured event contracts are binary options
where either an event takes place and the contract pays, or the event
does not take place and the speculator receives nothing.183 Futures-
based event contracts are those that allow users to receive a multiplier
beyond the initial outlay.184
The event contract must fall within the definition of “commodity”
or “excluded commodity.”185 An excluded commodity is particularly
relevant to event contracts and “is defined to be, as relevant here, ‘an
occurrence, or contingency associated with a financial or economic
consequence that is not within the control of the parties to the rele-
vant transaction.’”186 No court has adopted the theory that event con-
tracts are excluded commodities.187
The Dodd–Frank Act emerged as a response to the economic vola-
tility of its preceding years.188 The invention of swaps to provide a
financial instrument that can meet the exact specifications of a partic-
ular party created an evolution in the commodities market, which was
once characterized by the template structure of commodity futures
where only the price fluctuated.189 The Dodd–Frank Act is “849
pages, 16 titles, and 225 new rules across 11 agencies.”190 One of the
weaknesses of the Dodd–Frank Act was that it failed to sufficiently
provide clarity and regulatory oversight for the “shadow banking sys-
181. During a quasi-academic conference, a lawyer representing several DraftKings
managers mentioned a number of federal-level probes of the DFS industry. See Staff,
Here’s Where the Federal Investigations Into Daily Fantasy Sports Might Be Focused,
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Mar. 18, 2016, 4:47 PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/9053/
dfs-federal-issues [https://perma.cc/9VD9-ZYFQ].
182. See Overstreet et al., supra note 104, at 9. R
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 9–10.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 10.
188. See Chelsea J. Bacher, Regulating the Swaps Market After the Dodd–Frank
Act: In an Economic Crisis, Is Regulation Always the Answer?, 5 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 545, 546 (2010).
189. Id. at 550–51.
190. See Matthew Richardson, Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd–Frank Act, 3Q/
2012 ECON. PERSP. 85, 85 (2012).
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tem” and “regulatory arbitrage.”191 While it is unclear as to whether
event futures are covered, the Dodd–Frank Act did provide some
clarity to the issue.192
Section 745 of the Dodd–Frank Act modified the CEA and includes
section 5(c), which provides as follows:
(C) SPECIAL RULE FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF
EVENT
CONTRACTS AND SWAPS CONTRACTS.—
(i) EVENT CONTRACTS.—In connection with the listing of
agreements, contracts, transactions, or swaps in excluded commodi-
ties that are based upon the occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or
contingency (other than a change in the price, rate, value, or levels
of a commodity described in section 1a(2)(i)), by a designated con-
tract market or swap execution facility, the Commission may deter-
mine that such agreements, contracts, or transactions are contrary
to the public interest if the agreements, contracts, or transactions
involve—
(I) activity that is unlawful under any Federal or State law;
(II) terrorism;
(III) assassination;
(IV) war;
(V) gaming; or
(VI) other similar activity determined by the Commission, by rule
or regulation, to be contrary to the public interest.193
In response to the changes implemented by the Dodd–Frank Act,
the CFTC issued a question and answer sheet (“Q & A Sheet”) re-
garding the rule implementation.194 The Q & A Sheet noted that the
rules adopted by the CFTC “prohibit the listing or clearing of event
contracts based upon certain excluded commodities.”195 The excluded
commodities include: “(I) activity that is unlawful under any Federal
or State law; (II) terrorism; (III) assassination; (IV) war; (V) gaming;
or (VI) other similar activity determined by the Commission, by rule
or regulation to be contrary to the public interest.”196 In the Q & A
Sheet, the CFTC noted that the list of prohibited contract subjects is
not exhaustive and is subject to future modification.197 To date, the
only known interpretation of section 745 occurred in the CFTC’s or-
191. Id. at 93.
192. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 745(c)(5)(C)(i)–(iii), 124 Stat. 1376, 1736–37 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i)–(iii) (2018)).
193. Id. § 745(c)(5)(c)(i).
194. See CFTC, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, Q & A – PART 40 FINAL RULEMAKING
1, http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/p40_qa_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3Y8T-GTY7] [hereinafter CFTC Q & A SHEET].
195. Id.
196. See Dodd–Frank Act § 745(c)(5)(C)(i)(I)–(IV), 124 Stat. at 1737.
197. See CFTC Q & A SHEET, supra note 194, at 3 (answering “[n]o” to the ques- R
tion “Are all event contracts prohibited under the final regulations?”).
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der denying NADEX the ability to offer political event contracts.198 In
the NADEX’s response letter, NADEX referenced that the “gaming”
exception prohibits Super Bowl event contracts.199 NADEX cited
statements by Senator Blanche Lincoln, who posited that “an ‘event
contract’ around sporting events such as the Super Bowl, the Ken-
tucky Derby, and Masters Golf Tournament” lacks a “commercial
purpose.”200 The CFTC has never issued an official interpretation of
the meaning of “gaming” in the list of excluded commodities. While
the CFTC denied NADEX’s proposed political event offering, the
CFTC issued a no-action letter in 2014 to Victoria University to offer
political futures, raising the possibility that the CFTC has reconsid-
ered its original position.201
While the status of any current investigations by securities or invest-
ment regulators is unknown, some DFS companies may ultimately
have to answer questions in the future regarding the nature of their
products and whether they illegally facilitate off-exchange trading in
excluded event contracts.202 If DFS companies offer prohibited event
contracts—because their sport derivative contracts fall within the defi-
nition of “excluded commodities”—then, these companies may be
subject to either civil or criminal penalties.
Most DFS companies offer GPPs, 50/50s, and head-to-head con-
tests, though many have their own specific, unique offerings. GPP
contests and 50/50 contests are likely the most popular, perhaps be-
cause they offer the most money.203 These contests do not resemble
products that the CFTC has previously taken action against. Indeed,
such contests appear to operate in a manner more similar to a lottery
or a sports pool.204 The head-to-head contests offered by DFS compa-
198. See CFTC Order on Political Events Contracts, supra note 158, at 4. R
199. NADEX Comment Letter, supra note 152, at 5. R
200. 156 CONG. REC. at S5907 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Lincoln).
Senator Lincoln further clarified that event contracts around sporting events “would
be used solely for gambling” and argued that the CFTC “needs the power to, and
should, prevent derivatives contracts that are contrary to the public interest because
they exist predominantly to enable gambling.” Id. at S5906–07.
201. See CFTC No-Action Letter to Quigley, supra note 161. R
202. See 17 C.F.R. § 40.11 (2018); see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 6c, 7 (2018).
203. See Ehrman, supra note 9, at 86. R
204. A sports pool is a type of sports gambling where “all money bet on the result
of a particular event by a number of people is awarded to one or more winners ac-
cording to conditions established in advance (taxes, operating expenses, and other
charges may be deducted from the total pool before prizes are awarded).” See Pool,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/pool-gambling (last
visited Dec. 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/M3KY-7JD8]. In 1991, Florida Attorney Gen-
eral Robert Butterworth opined that participation in certain fantasy sports leagues
where a fee is paid to enter is a form of illegal gambling. See Robert Butterworth,
Advisory Legal Opinion — AGO 91-03, FLA. OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (Jan. 8, 1991), http://
www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/9ADEF3B402960199852562A6006FB71E
[https://perma.cc/3HMR-WFZL]. The Nevada Office of the Attorney General con-
cluded that DFS contests constitute sports pools. See Memorandum from J. Brin Gib-
son, Bureau Chief of Gaming & Gov’t Affairs & Ketan D. Bhirud, Head of Complex
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nies all allow customers to choose to enter a contest; however, several
DFS operators attempt to match individuals who are not matched by a
designated time.205 The basic head-to-head contest involves a cus-
tomer selecting a contest and choosing a line-up of real-world athletes,
and the customer remains blind to other potential entrants line-ups.
The second customer (or offeree) enters into the same contest with
the assertion that his or her chosen line-up will perform better than
the first customer’s—the offeror’s—line-up. The margin of victory be-
tween the two contestants is immaterial.206 The payment of the head-
to-head contest “contract” between the two only depends on whether
one contestant’s line-up outperforms the other’s. Each head-to-head
contest acts as a yes (or no) wager that one fantasy roster line-up will
defeat the other.207 DFS contests likely do not offer a bona fide com-
mercial purpose that would distinguish such contests from the exam-
ples mentioned by Senator Lincoln in 2010.208
A bet on a sporting event is possibly within the definition of “gam-
ing” under the Dodd–Frank Act.209 The challenge of bringing a civil
or criminal action against a DFS company is that the CFTC has not
yet taken a public enforcement action against an operator who prima-
rily deals in sports derivatives.210 While each site’s head-to-head con-
Litig. to A.G. Burnett, Chairman, Nev. Gaming Control Bd., Terry Johnson, Member,
Nev. Gaming Control Bd. & Shawn Reid, Member, Nev. Gaming Control Bd. (Oct.
16, 2015), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Nevada-AG-
DFS.pdf [https://perma.cc/644N-RW8U]. Indeed, FanDuel described their business
model as part of its filings in litigation in New York stating: “In fantasy sports . . . ,
participants pay an entry fee to participate in a contest, and the entry fees generate
the fund from which the successful contestants win prizes.” Brief for Defendant-Ap-
pellant at 20, New York v. FanDuel, Inc., No. 453056/15 (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 22,
2016) [hereinafter FanDuel Brief].
205. See Rules, supra note 175 (expand “Unfilled Contests”). R
206. FanDuel and DraftKings have each argued in court documents that the fantasy
contest is a separate event vis-a`-vis the actual athletic event from which relevant
player-level statistics are derived. FanDuel’s attorney’s posited “fantasy sports com-
petitors are active participants in a parallel fantasy contest of their own, which exists
separate and apart from any underlying athletic event and does not turn on the out-
come of any such event, or on the outcome of any other single real-world occur-
rence.” FanDuel Brief, supra note 204, at 12. FanDuel’s arguments show how fantasy R
sports are similar to how other certain financial products, which derive from an un-
derlying security or asset—like Collateralized Debt Obligations—are unique. See
Memorandum of FanDuel Inc. in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 37–38, New York v. FanDuel, Inc., No. 453056/2015 (N.Y. App. Div.
Nov. 23, 2015).
207. It may be possible in some DFS iterations to intentionally select a losing line-
up for purposes of money laundering.
208. See 156 CONG. REC. S5906–07 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Lincoln).
209. This does not preclude any company or individual from self-certifying and
seeking a no-action letter from the CFTC if they believe that a DFS exchange may
present a value to society. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2 (2018); see also CFTC Order on Politi-
cal Events Contracts, supra note 158, at 2 nn.1–2. R
210. The CFTC did mention TradeSports in its complaint; however, there was no
specific mention of TradeSports specifically offending CFTC regulations. See Com-
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tests are slightly different, companies that attempt to match unfilled
head-to-head match-ups may present an additional aggravating factor
in considering whether the CFTC could ever move forward with an
enforcement action.211 While other companies may argue that their
sites allow users to compete against each other, sites that use auto-
mated matching are more closely related to the electronic clearing
mechanisms that match buyers and sellers of financial products at a
matched price.212 Although nearly all DFS sites offer head-to-head
contests that—by virtue of the Dodd–Frank Act, interpretations of
the CFTC’s earlier orders, and judicial decisions—may fall within the
jurisdiction of the CFTC, there has been no indication that the CFTC
is currently investigating any DFS companies. Nevertheless, the CFTC
likely could bring charges against certain DFS operators arguing that
their head-to-head contests represent event contracts.
B. What If the CFTC Asserts Jurisdiction?
On October 5, 2015, the New York Times observed “[a] major scan-
dal is erupting in the multibillion-dollar industry of fantasy sports.”213
The major scandal referred to allegations that an employee at DraftK-
ings, with access to valuable non-public information, participated in
contests on FanDuel and was successful.214 A DraftKings spokesman
acknowledged that both DraftKings and FanDuel employees had won
“big jackpots” on rival sites, but both sites argued that their employ-
ees were forbidden from participating on their respective employer’s
website.215 While the major DFS companies denied that the employ-
ees used “insider information” to be successful on competitors’ web-
sites, such assertions were met with skepticism and arguably resulted
in unwanted attention on the industry that had asserted itself as being
fundamentally different than sports gambling.216
The events that precipitated the focus on employee access began on
September 27, 2015, when Ethan Haskell, of DraftKings, posted infor-
mation regarding how frequently participants selected certain NFL
plaint for Permanent Injunction, Civil Monetary Penalty, & Other Equitable Relief at
2–3, 6, 13–14, 16–17, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Trade Exch. Network,
Ltd., 1:12-CV-01902 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 2012).
211. See Rules, supra note 175 (expand “Unfilled Contests”). R
212. Electronic clearing systems enable the transfer of money and securities from
buyer to seller. See Tania Kishore Jaleel, What Is Electronic Clearing Service (ECS)?,
BUS. STANDARD (Jan. 20, 2013, 10:58 PM), http://www.business-standard.com/article/
pf/what-is-electronic-clearing-service-ecs-111070800019_1.html [https://perma.cc/JP8J-
3E936tg].
213. See Joe Drape & Jacqueline Williams, Scandal Erupts in Unregulated World of
Fantasy Sports, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/sports/
fanduel-draftkings-fantasy-employees-bet-rivals.html [https://perma.cc/MXB8-
ADV5].
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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players on the DraftKings website.217 Such information provided the
holder with a distinct advantage over competitors, as knowing who the
most commonly held players were would provide the user the ability
to incrementally distinguish his or her fantasy line-up to finish ahead
of others.218 While Haskell denied using his access at DraftKings to
procure ownership data for personal use, he won a prize of $350,000
on FanDuel in a single contest.219 The allegations against Haskell were
not an isolated incident in the DFS industry. In addition to Haskell, a
FanDuel employee—Matt Boccio—was also an avid DFS player.220
Indeed, Boccio was responsible for setting the values assigned to play-
ers on FanDuel, and Rotogrinders ranked him amongst the top fifty
DFS contestants in the world.221 Additionally, some DraftKings’ em-
ployees engaged in the practice of “bumhunting” in which they re-
peatedly targeted “suboptimal player[s]” in head-to-head match-
ups.222 DraftKings employee Jon Aguilar also revealed to an invitee at
a DraftKings event that he had access to player usage data, which
could be used to differentiate a line-up to increase the odds of not
having to split a prize.223
The release of information regarding the win rates of highly success-
ful players followed the DFS insider information scandals. During a
time period in 2015, the top eleven DFS players accounted for 17% of
studied entry fees and had an average positive return on investment of
+7%, compared to the bottom 80% of players who had a negative
return on investment of -51%.224 The “shark versus minnow” issue
represented a challenge for DFS companies to overcome, especially
when it appeared that a number of the successful customers worked
for the DFS operators themselves and could access proprietary infor-
mation that may provide an important advantage over competitors.225
If DFS sites are within the scope of the CFTC’s jurisdiction, it follows
that DFS companies may have an additional concern regarding the
use of insider information and potential charges for implicated
employees.226
217. See John Culhane, The DraftKings Crash, SLATE (Oct. 13, 2015, 4:47 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2015/10/
the_insider_trading_scandals_could_bring_down_draftkings_and_fanduel.html
[https://perma.cc/GMY3-GX2S].
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Drape & Williams, supra note 213. R
221. Joe Drape & Jacqueline Williams, In Fantasy Sports, Signs of Insiders’ Edge,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes/com/2015/10/12/sports/fantasy-
sports-draftkings-fanduel-insiders-edge-football.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Z85T-
FCU7].
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See Miller & Singer, supra note 74. R
225. Id.
226. See Curt Woodward, US Fantasy Sports Inquiries Could Drag on, Lawyer Says,
BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 8, 2016), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/04/07/federal-
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On December 31, 2015, the international law firm of Sidley Austin
released a client advisory update titled: CFTC Asserts Its Broader
Fraud Jurisdiction and Steps into the World of Insider Trading.227 The
update noted that the CFTC brought a regulatory filing against Arya
Motazedi, a commodities trader who fraudulently executed trades on
his personal accounts while utilizing company accounts to achieve
favorable prices—a practice known as front-running.228 The CFTC
obtained an order against Motazedi which found him responsible for
several violations of the CEA, including Section 4b: Fraud, which
states:
Section 4b(a) makes it unlawful for any person, in or in connection
with any order to make, or the making of, any contract of sale of
any commodity in interstate commerce or for future delivery that is
made, on or subject to the rules of a designated contract market, for
or on behalf of any other person: (A) to cheat or defraud or attempt
to cheat or defraud such other person; or (C) willfully to deceive or
attempt to deceive such other person by any means whatsoever in
regard to any such order or contract or the disposition or execution
of any such order or contract, or in regard to any act or agency
performed with respect to such order or contract for such person.229
Fraud charges related to front-running are common.230 However,
the use of section 6(c)(1)—which was added under the Dodd–Frank
Act and utilized against Motazedi—was a sign that the CFTC was in-
tent on attacking both fraud and manipulation of regulated mar-
kets.231 Section 6(c)(1) states:
(1) Prohibition against manipulation
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to use or
employ, or attempt to use or employ, in connection with any swap,
or a contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or
for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance, in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission shall promul-
gate by not later than 1 year after July 21, 2010, provided no rule or
regulation promulgated by the Commission shall require any person
to disclose to another person nonpublic information that may be
material to the market price, rate, or level of the commodity trans-
action, except as necessary to make any statement made to the
fantasy-sports-probes-could-drag-out-for-months-lawyer-says/J9HZ1FSZzspUCcIcl-
qUuRL/story.html [https://perma.cc/E79L-2JT6].
227. See Geoffrey Aronow & Michael Sackheim, CFTC Asserts Its Broader Fraud
Jurisdiction and Steps Into the World of Insider Trading, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Dec.
31, 2015), http://www.sidley.com/news/12-31-2015-investment-funds-update [https://
perma.cc/LU45-ZWP2].
228. Id.
229. See In re Arya Motazedi, CFTC No. 16-02, 2015 WL 7880066 at *3 (Dec. 2,
2015).
230. Aronow & Sackheim, supra note 227. R
231. Id.
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other person in or in connection with the transaction not misleading
in any material respect.232
The Motazedi case was not a traditional case of market manipula-
tion.233 In a traditional case, the action asserts a manipulation claim
and the agency receives an order deeming such. The Motazedi case is
meaningful as to explaining the scope of what constitutes the CFTC’s
view of manipulation.234 The CFTC sent a strong message.235 Con-
trary to the perception that insider trading in all markets has always
been illegal, insider trading was previously “entirely legal in the com-
modities and futures markets,” and some suggest there may still be
leeway in commodities and futures markets.236 The 10(b)(5) protec-
tions in the Securities Act were designed to protect the “retail inves-
tor,” but historically only commodities experts ventured into the
commodities and futures markets.237 This previous perception is al-
most certainly false, as at least 12.5% of the participants in the com-
modities market would be classified as retail investors.238 Even with
the advent of the Dodd–Frank Act, there remains a gap in the power
to regulate insider trading in securities and commodities markets.239
The purpose of regulating insider trading is to protect against those
who breach their duties of “trust and confidence.”240 The question of
whether DFS employee insiders breached a duty of trust or confi-
dence is a question for a jury to answer. There is a possibility that the
CFTC could assert jurisdiction over the DFS head-to-head contests as
event futures contracts. Beyond the CFTC, federal prosecutors pos-
sess broad power to act against fraud: “The mail and wire fraud stat-
utes enable the federal government to prosecute virtually anyone who
uses either of these ubiquitous means in furtherance of a fraudulent
scheme.”241 As such, wire and mail fraud statutes may incorporate a
broader level of activity than insider trading statutes.242 The terms
232. Id. at 6.
233. See id. at 3.
234. Id.
235. See Craig R. Enochs et al., CFTC Enforces Insider Trading Rules and Aggres-
sively Pursues Its New Enforcement Authority Under the Dodd–Frank Act, REED
SMITH (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.reedsmith.com/CFTC-Enforces-Insider-Trading-
Rules-and-Aggressively-Pursues-Its-New-Enforcement-Authority-under-the-Dodd-
Frank-Act-12-22-2015 [https://perma.cc/Z9MS-UXC7].
236. Andrew Verstein, Insider Trading in Commodities Markets, 102 VA. L. REV.
447, 448 (2016).
237. See id. at 449.
238. Id. at 482.
239. Id. at 499–500.
240. Id. at 487.
241. Susan Getzendanner, Judicial “Pruning” of “Garden Variety Fraud” Civil
RICO Cases Does Not Work: It’s Time for Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV. 673, 680
(1990).
242. William K.S. Wang, Application of the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to
Criminal Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 220, 222 (2015). Indeed, internal documents from FanDuel revealed in state-
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wire and mail incorporate a broad range of activities, including the use
of the internet.243 Thus, the pursuit of federal charges against DFS
companies and their employees may provide a less novel avenue than
risking an adverse ruling by attempting to litigate a case of first im-
pression as to whether DFS contests fall within the scope of the
CFTC’s jurisdiction.244 It is likely that head-to-head DFS contests
could be considered prohibited event contracts by virtue of the
Dodd–Frank Act’s special rules for event contracts; however, given
the lack of judicial interpretation of section 745 of the Dodd–Frank
Act and the high profile nature of the DFS industry, federal agencies
may elect prosecution under more established statutes.
level litigation showed that FanDuel issued a memo to employees and required a
signature as acknowledgement that employees should not win excessive amounts of
money on rival sites, so as to avoid the impression of improprieties. See Complaint at
19–20, People v. FanDuel, Inc., No. 435056/15, 2015 WL 8490461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov.
17, 2015); see also Kevin Draper, FanDuel Told Employees Not to Win Too Much
Money on DraftKings or People Would Get Suspicious, DEADSPIN (Nov. 20, 2015, 3:58
PM), http://www.deadspin.com/fanduel-told-employees-not-to-win-too-much-money-
on-dra-1743814536 [https://perma.cc/78AU-SUP5].
243. Wang, supra note 242, at 226. R
244. “Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means
of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme
or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both. If the violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized, trans-
ported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, a presiden-
tially declared major disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in section 102
of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 5122 (2018))), or affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more
than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1343
(2018). Mail fraud is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and states: “Whoever, having de-
vised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money
or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or
to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or
procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or
other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such coun-
terfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or
attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter,
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits
or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any
private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such mat-
ter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to
the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the
person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation occurs in relation to, or
involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or
paid in connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as
those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5122)), or affects a financial institution, such
person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years,
or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018).
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V. CONCLUSION
While head-to-head DFS contests could plausibly be construed as
unregistered exchanges, the more pressing issue is likely whether DFS
head-to-head contests are prohibited event contracts and constitute
gaming under CFTC regulations derived from the Dodd–Frank Act.
The CFTC also has broad jurisdiction to prohibit the listing of an
event contract as contrary to the public interest, which the CFTC
noted in its NADEX order.245 The way in which many DFS sites oper-
ate head-to-head contests—effectively as binary sport derivative con-
tracts—may render those contests within the scope of prohibited
event contracts under the CFTC’s jurisdiction. Thus, DFS sites would
need an exemption to avoid non-compliance with the provisions listed
in the Dodd–Frank Act. The broad jurisdiction granted to the CFTC,
coupled with the agency’s prior enforcement actions, suggests that the
CFTC could pursue regulatory oversight in the context of DFS head-
to-head contests.
Applying CFTC regulations to DFS head-to-head contests may re-
present an additional challenge for DFS operators, many of whom un-
derestimated the potential sources of liability facing the industry.246
The CFTC’s jurisdiction over event contracts could potentially set up
the agency to one day regulate the DFS market or even a sports gam-
bling market. Specifically, it appears likely that the CFTC could regu-
late certain DFS contests—especially the head-to-head variety—as a
type of financial product.
245. See CFTC Order on Political Events Contracts, supra note 158, at 2–4. R
246. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act was widely cited by many
within the industry as evidence that the games were lawful. This position is likely a
hyperbolic interpretation of the importance of the statute given that the statute’s rule
of construction states that it does not modify any existing state or federal law. 31
U.S.C. § 5361(b) (2018). See also Holden, supra note 156, at 108. R
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